Widely publicized reports of fresh MBAs receiving multiple job offers with six-figure annual salaries leave a long-lasting general impression about the high quality of selected business schools. Business Week reports on a regular basis ranking of MBA programs based on subjective surveys of students and employers.
1.

Introduction
Since 1988, Business Week biennially publishes a list of the top-ranked business schools in the U.S.
This ranking reflects survey questionnaire responses from corporate recruiters, on the one hand, and current and recent graduates, on the other. Apart from enhancing the prestige of individual MBA programs, this ranking can significantly influence popular perception about the quality of the MBAs from different schools and, thus, affect their starting salaries. Survey results, however, rely on both subjective and objective factors.
Subjective factors may incorporate a prestige factor based on past accomplishments by an MBA program not actually reflected in its current experience. Reputations reflect hard-won achievements, but also seem impervious to change from new challengers. In other words, reputation embodies "capital" that is difficult to squander, once achieved. Moreover, the survey respondents' perception of the objective factors may prove erroneous. In sum, the perceptions recorded in survey findings may significantly differ from the objective facts. This paper ranks MBA programs on numerous objective factors and compares those "objective" rankings to the "subjective" rankings of the Business Week survey results.
The ranking of MBA programs may differ depending on the target audience. MBA students may value different criteria for ranking programs as compared to employers. Such variables as increase in salary from pre-to post-MBA program and the number of job offers post-MBA program reflect the interests of the MBA students. Employers, on the other hand, may value such factors as the selectivity of MBA programs, the GMAT scores of entering students, the faculty-student ratio, and the program's budget. Of course, since the MBA programs must serve both the students and the employers, program administrators should value both sets of factors.
Conceptually, a professional education produces the stock of marketable human capital of the individuals graduating from the program. Although far from perfect, the salary offer received on graduation provides a reasonable index of the market value of that human capital. Students enter the MBA programs, however, with varying initial stocks of human capital. Pre-MBA earnings provide an index of the human capital acquired prior to entering the program. Thus, the incremental contribution of the program measures the differential between the pre-and post-MBA annual earnings, after adjusting for the cost of attending the MBA program. Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) rank business schools employing what they call the "market-based" approach. Using regression analysis, they determine the value added by an MBA program, which they then use to rank MBA programs.
1 The Tracy-Waldfogel ranking provides important information to MBA students. But it does not provide good information to employers or MBA program administrators. For example, a high-value-added program may start with lower quality students. Thus, employers may not find a high ranking that helpful. In other words, while value added may provide important information to MBA students, the total value may represent more valuable information to employers. And what is most important in total value, holding the MBA education value-added constant, is the quality of the inputs used in the production process.
Reputational ranking of a business school primarily reflects popular perception of its graduates in their post-MBA careers. The starting pay package by itself does not accurately reflect the success level of a school. 2 Most top-rated MBA programs admit only students with high 1 They distinguish between the quality of an MBA program and the quality of its students. They regress the average starting salary (adjusted for differences in cost-of-living) on a number of student attributes and interpret the residual as value added by the program. Their revised ranking of MBA programs does contain a few surprises in that side by side with the heavyweights like Stanford, Harvard, and Chicago, much less recognized programs such as Oklahoma State, New Mexico, and Wake Forest feature in their "Value-Added Top 10" list.
2 For example, Harvard MBAs report average starting base salary of $90,675 and a total compensation package worth $163,792 (including other compensation of $51,917 and a one time signing bonus of $21,200) for the graduating class of 1998. For the graduates of Marriott School of Business at Brigham Young University (BYU), the corresponding average base salary and total compensation package equal $66,789 and $99,180, respectively. What is seldom mentioned is that the average pre-MBA salary of Harvard's graduating class already equals a high value of $68,000 and a much more modest $27,684 at BYU. In fact, when accounting for differences in tuition and other expenses, the annuitized value of the gain in earnings for BYU graduates exceeds that for the Harvard graduates.
GMAT scores. Thus, their graduates are pre-selected for a successful post-MBA career. In sum, the extent of "value added" is often overstated.
Good management education should produce efficient managers. Efficient management of production requires optimal utilization of resources. Efficiency is inconsistent with either unrealized potential increase in output or avoidable waste of inputs. To what extent do these top rated MBA programs practice what they preach? More specifically, do these MBA programs themselves, when viewed as production units, efficiently use their resources?
Decision making problems parallel production processes, where desirable outcomes of the decision play the role of outputs while actions or conditions facilitating these outcomes play the role of inputs. One important variables measures how business schools widens the difference between the post-MBA and pre-MBA salaries of its graduates. Also, the number of job offers provides another output dimension. Inputs, on the other hand, include faculty and other resources employed as well as the quality of the entering class. Other factors, such as the gender ratio and the proportion of international students, can affect the outputs, and therefore they may enter as inputs in an appropriately specified model. Ray and Jeon (2003) broaden the discussion of MBA program reputation or ranking to include production efficiency. Employing a production model and data envelopment analysis (DEA), they examine the reputation and production efficiency of MBA programs. 3 4 The 3 Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) introduce the DEA method to non-parametrically measure technical efficiency of production units with reference to a technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. Subsequently, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) generalize the model to accommodate variable returns to scale. The data come from the following web site: http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/index.html. 4 A number of studies use DEA to examine production and efficiency in education. Johnes and Johnes (1993) employ DEA to measure research efficiency of a number of Economics departments from British universities based on publication and personnel data collected by the Royal Economic Society. Burton and Phimister (1994) apply DEA to evaluate efficiency of a set of "core journals" identified by Diamond (1989) . Breu and Raab (1994) analyze the data from the Top-25 National universities and Liberal Arts colleges to measure their efficiency levels using DEA. They production process combines inputs to produce outputs. The calculation of a most efficient frontier then allows the computation of production efficiency for each of the MBA programs in the sample. Efficiency is measured in three ways -output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency measures. Output-oriented efficiency determines by how much one can technically increase output, using the observed inputs. Input-oriented efficiency determines by how much one can technically reduce inputs to produce the observed outputs. Finally, the global efficiency measure determines how much one can technically increase outputs and decrease inputs simultaneously to produce on the production frontier.
Similar to Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) and Ray and Jeon (2003) , we also use objectively measured "inputs" and "outputs" rather than subjective scores based on survey responses to rank the individual MBA programs. As explained below, we use net salary gain measured by the difference between pre-and post-MBA salaries adjusted for tuition and fees as one component of the output bundle that also includes the average number of job offers received by a typical graduate of a program as another component. We use a number of student characteristics alongside a number of variables representing MBA program resources as inputs.
This paper explores the reputation or ranking of MBA programs using several approaches. First, we develop three rankings based on simple averages of individual rankings across the outputs, across the inputs, and across a simple combination of outputs and inputs.
Those rankings reflect our categorization of who cares about what. That is, MBA students will find that several of the best-rated universities like Cal Tech (rated 5 th ) and Chicago (rated 10 th ) operate at less than 90% efficiency. Colbert, Levary and Shaner (1999) determine an alternative ranking of U.S. MBA programs based on DEA using the survey response scores reported in the Business Week study. They also compare the U.S. programs with three foreign MBA programs. As pointed out by Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) , a valid ranking should incorporate objective criteria that are comparable across programs and should also be based on "outputs" rather than "inputs". The Colbert, Levary, and Shaner (1999) study, like the original Business Week ranking, falls short on this count.
focus on the outputs ranking, employers on the inputs ranking, and the MBA program administrators on a combination of outputs and inputs ranking. Second, we also report rankings developed by Ray and Jeon (2003) based on production efficiency -output-oriented, inputoriented, and global efficiency. Here again, MBA students focus on the output-oriented efficiency ranking, employers focus on the input-oriented efficiency ranking, and the MBA program administers focus on the global efficiency ranking. Finally, we combine the first two rankings by simple averages to generate our most comprehensive rankings.
Data Definitions and Descriptive Analysis of MBA Programs
In this study, we consider two outputs and six inputs contained in the business school production process. 5 The first output (gain) measures the difference between the annuitized pre-and post-MBA earnings flow of a representative graduate of the school, which we treat as the value added.
Management education helps the students acquire and develop various management skills, which make them more valuable to subsequent employers. Therefore, in an efficient market, a graduate with better skills relevant for effective management should receive a higher salary. The second output equals the adjusted placement rate (jobs). More worthy candidates usually generate multiple job offers. Given that the job placement rate does not reach 100%, however, the average number of offers received by the graduates who actually get any offer is adjusted by the probability that a graduating student has an offer in hand.
The six inputs include: (i) the faculty-student ratio (f/s), (ii) the average GMAT score of the incoming class (gmat), (iii) the degree of selectivity in the admission process measured by the percentage of applications rejected (%reject), (iv) the expenditure per student (ex/stud), (v) the percentage of male students in the class (%male), and (vi) the percentage of U.S. students in the class (%US). The faculty-student ratio measures an important school input. An increase in the faculty-student ratio should contribute positively to the output bundle. The student's background is measured in two alternative ways. One measure equals the percentage of applicants rejected for admission by a school. The more selective the school is, the higher is its rejection rate and the better is the quality of its graduating students. Self-selection, however, may occur in the applicant pools across MBA programs, where better applicants target only the more reputed MBA programs (like Pennsylvania or Northwestern). In that case, the second quartile of the pool of applicants for one school may include better applicants than the top quartile for another. Hence, an eighty-percent rejection rate for both MBA programs does not imply the same quality of the students admitted. An alternative selectivity measures equals the average gmat scores of the in-coming class across MBA programs. In this study, we include both measures of student quality as inputs. Finally, ex/stud measures resources spent (expenditure) per student.
When developing efficiency measures for the MBA programs, Ray and Jeon (2003) employ two additional input control variables. 6 Those two demographic variables, %male and %US, reflect characteristics of the students that may affect their salaries without affecting their managerial ability. Due to family constraints, a female MBA exhibits less mobility than the male MBA counterpart in her class, implying that her starting salary is lower, on average. Also, a gender bias may exist against female graduates in the market. For both reasons, a school with a higher proportion of female students may experience a lower expected salary increase (pre-vs. post-MBA). Similar logic applies for a school with a higher proportion of international students. Often, due to visa problems, MBAs who are not U.S. residents accept jobs that pay lower than average.
On the other hand, outstanding MBAs who are foreign nationals may return to their own countries.
As a result, the average salaries of those who accept employment in the U.S. are probably lower.
By including the inputs %male and %US, we control for these two "qualitative dimensions" of the student input. Table 1 per student. University of Tennessee, Knoxville spends a mere $3,400 per student. South Carolina spending of $9,400 per pupil was the second lowest. MBA programs in higher categories exhibit, as expected, more selective classes with both higher average GMAT scores and higher rejection rates. Stanford accepts only 7% of the applicants and enrolls a class with an average GMAT score of 722. At the other extreme, Clark --Atlanta (ranked 54 th ) with a rejection rate nearly 30%
possesses an average GMAT score of only 430. The proportion of US students does not move much (between 72 and 74%), on average, across all three categories. Compared to the other categories, tier-3 MBA programs possess a higher proportion of female students (34%).
Constructing and Interpreting Alternative Rankings of MBA Programs
As noted above, the Business Week rankings of MBA programs uses surveys of students and employers to measure their combined perceptions of the quality of MBA programs. We argue that the combining of surveys, including students and employers, mixes apples and oranges. In this section, we develop objective rankings of MBA programs that address the interests of students, employers, and MBA program administrators separately. Moreover, we compare those "objective" rankings with the "subjective" Business Week rankings.
First, consider the interests of the students, which, we argue, reflect the value added (gain) and the number of job offers (jobs) produced by MBA programs, our output measures. We ranked the MBA programs based on value added and job offers separately. Then we took a simple average of the rankings on these two dimensions and ranked the resulting outcomes to generate an overall output ranking. Second, consider the interests of the employer, which, we argue, reflect the faculty-student ratio (f/s), the rejection percentage (%reject), the GMAT score (gmat), and the expenditure per student (ex/stud) invested by the MBA program into the pool of students attracted to the MBA program, given their screening devices. As we did for our output measures, we rank MBA programs based on each individual input. Next, we take a simple average of those input rankings and generate an overall input ranking. Then, we compare our "objective" rankings with the "subjective" rankings from the Business Week survey. 9 Table 3 reports the findings. Once again, the last column reports the difference between the Business Week ranking and our overall input ranking.
The ranking of MBA programs based on individual inputs generates an interesting observation. Higher rejection percentages or higher GMAT scores associate with a higher Business Week ranking. That is, higher ranked MBA programs prove much more selective in admitting students into their programs, not a surprise. Also, higher expenditure per student associates with a higher Business Week ranking. Unexpectedly, a lower faculty-student ratio associates with a higher Business Week ranking. We interpret this observation as follows. Higher ranked MBA programs in the Business Week rankings select students with high ability and promise. Moreover, a low facultystudent ratio implies, on average, a large MBA program. Thus, employers can pick from a large pool of extremely promising students. Conversely, a large faculty-student ratio may signal a small MBA program with many fewer students in any graduating class. Third, consider the interests of MBA program administrators, which, we argue, reflect the interests of the students and employers. That is, program administrators consider both outputs and inputs. Now, we take the overall output and input rankings developed in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, calculate a simple average of those two rankings, and produce a combined ranking that includes both outputs and inputs. 11 Since the Business Week method uses surveys of students and employees, that ranking, in spirit, comes the closest to our combined ranking. The crucial difference, however, remains -our ranking uses "objective" data while the Business Week survey incorporates "subjective" judgment. Table 4 reports the findings of the combined ranking as well as the difference between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking. Fourth, the administrator can also evaluate an MBA program as a production process.
Efficient production requires the maximum outputs from a given set of inputs or the minimum inputs to produce a given set of outputs. As noted above, Ray and Jeon (2003) calculate MBA program efficiency, using output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency measures. That methodology tries to increase outputs, decrease inputs, or both simultaneously to achieve production efficiency. 12 13 Table 5 reports rankings based on DEA efficiency calculations. 14 Thirty 11 Spearman rank correlation between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking equals 0.75. 12 We already note that the faculty-student ratio associates with Business Week ranking in a counterintuitive fashion. That is, a lower faculty-student ratio associates with a higher ranking. The DEA methodology imposes the opposite movement on the faculty-student ratio for improving efficiency. In that sense, calculating production efficiency of MBA programs exhibit no inefficiency in the output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency measures. Thus, when ranking MBA programs by efficiency, those 30 MBA programs all tied for first place in the rankings. We allow the Business Week ranking to rank MBA programs among those efficient programs. Finally, we combine the rankings based on the raw output and input data (i.e., Table 4 , column 3) with the ranking based on the DEA efficiency (i.e., Table 5 , column 3), using a simple MBA programs seems to work well for all outputs and every input, except the faculty-student ratio.
average. 16 17 Table 6 reports the findings. Northwestern into the number one spot, followed in order by Pennsylvania, Michigan, Chicago, and Duke.
Conclusion
The ranking of MBA programs by Business Week provides important information for employers, students, and program administrators. That ranking, however, mixes the responses of students and employers together, giving an overall evaluation of the MBA programs. Students, employers, and program administrators possess different interests that should reflect different characteristics in their individual ranking schemes. This paper provides different ranking schemes for these three different groups.
The Business Week ranking also relies on the perceptions of the participants in its MBA program survey. That is, survey respondents will use both objective and subjective factors in responding to the survey. Moreover, the survey respondents may not have accurate information on the objective facts. The subjective factors critically include the reputation of the program receiving a ranking. Reputations take much time and effort to build, but once established, they can persist for a long time, even if the effort to maintain the program after establishing its reputation slackens. 16 Note that the DEA efficiency rankings introduce to some extent the Business Week rankings based on their survey of students and employers, since ties in the efficiency score revert to that ranking.
Thus, MBA programs attempting to climb in the rankings will feel that the survey does not adequately reward the efforts that they have made to improve their program. In addition, MBA programs with strong reputations may continue to rank highly, even though the quality of the program has deteriorated. This paper provides rankings based on objective facts and compares those rankings to the Business Week rankings that incorporate subjective factors.
The various rankings divide into three groups as follows. Student rankings reflect two outputs -the gain in income from pre-to post-MBA program adjusted for the cost of attending the program and the average number of job offers received. Employer rankings reflect four inputs -the faculty student ratio, the average GMAT score, the rejection percentage, and expenditure per student for the programs. Finally, the MBA program administrator rankings reflect both the outputs and the inputs. In addition, recognizing that program administrators run a "production process," the paper also reports MBA program rankings based on "production efficiency," where inputs produce outputs.
18
In sum, some MBA programs rise and others fall dramatically in the objective rankings as compared to the Business Week rankings. Tables 2 to 6 Spearman rank correlation between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking equals 0.74. 18 The efficiency numbers come from Ray and Jeon (2003) who provide details about the calculation of the efficiency numbers.
in the Business Week ranking, falls 26 places in our output ranking, 0 places in our input ranking, 13 places in our combined output and input ranking, 32 places in our production-efficiency ranking, and 28 places in our combined output-input ranking and the production-efficiency and NYU (1.4) all average a fall or rise of less than two places. For example, UNC, which ranks 19 th in the Business Week ranking, does not change in our output ranking, falls 10 places in our input ranking, falls 5 places in our combined output and input ranking, rises 8 places in our production-efficiency ranking, and rises 6 places in our combined output-input ranking and the production-efficiency ranking.
APPENDIX: Outputs and Inputs Definitions
Output 1: gain = average post MBA salary + annuity value of first year compensationaverage pre MBA salary -2 years times the annuity value of tuition and fee -including room & board where
(1) annuity value of first year compensation includes average signing bonus and average other compensation; interest rate is equal to 5% for the next 25 years 
Global Efficiency Measurement: Simple Example
Technical efficiency of a firm falls below 100%, when it is possible to increase any of its outputs without either lowering any other output or increasing any of its inputs. Similarly, a fully efficient firm cannot lower any of its inputs without at the same time either increasing some other input or lowering some output. Clearly, larger possible decreases in inputs or increased in outputs imply a lower firm efficiency. Because decreasing any input and/or increasing any output are desirable, the global efficiency measure incorporates both the input-saving and output-augmenting aspects of efficiency. Consider the following simple example, where four firms each use two inputs to produce two outputs. The input-output data of the firms are shown in the Table below. Firm A uses less of both inputs than B, while producing the same quantity of output 1 but a greater quantity of output 2. Firm C, on the other hand, produces more of both outputs, while using no more of input 2 and a lower quantity of input 1 than firm B does. Thus, both A and C prove more efficient than B. In contrast, Firm D produces greater quantities of both outputs and a lower quantity of input 1, but more of input 2 than B. Hence, we cannot directly compare the efficiency of B and D.
Compare B with A. If B could act like A, it could lower input 1 by 16.67% and input 2 by 11.11%, an average reduction of 13.89%. At the same time, output 2 could increase by 25% while output 1 does not change, an average increase in output of 12.5%. Thus, a global measure of the efficiency of firm B equals So far, we assumed that only all actually observed input-output combinations are feasible. Assume instead that any weighted average of the observed input-output bundles is also feasible. In that case, the simple average of the outputs and inputs of firms C and D equal 4.5 units of output 1 and 6 units of output 2 producible from 4 units of input 1 and 9 units of input 2. This hypothetical bundle generates a 33% decline in input 1, but no change in input 2 compared to firm B. At the same time, both outputs increase by 50%. Thus, a 16.5% average decline in inputs and 50% average increase in outputs occur, based on the hypothetical firm that is a simple average of firms C and D. Thus, the global efficiency of B relative to this hypothetical firm equals In this simple example, the benchmark emerges from a simple search. In more complex problems, an appropriate mathematical programming model selects the optimal weights for constructing the benchmark input-output bundle (see Ray and Jeon, 2003) . Note: The data include two outputs -gain and jobs -and six inputs -f/s, gmat, ex/stud, %male, and %US. The outputs measure the value added and the number of job offers, respectively. The inputs measure the faculty-student ratio, the GMAT score, the percentage rejection, the expenditure-student ratio, the percentage male applicants, and the percentage US applicants. See the appendix for more details. 
